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MODERN PHASES OF THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES AND RESTRAINTS UPON ALIENATION
APPLIED TO EtiTRUSTED PROPERTIES
IN THE STATE OF

CALIFOFk~IA

There is perhaps no legal subject more interesting nor
important in the sphere of trust activity than the so-called "Rule
against Perpetuities".

This rule is colorful in its historical

antecedents, and in its present form, as part and parcel of the
common law, is the creature of necessity evolved to prevent pro
perty owners from placing their property perpetually beyond the
reach of their descendants, or other beneficiaries.

The doctrine

compromises the conflict between those on the one hand who have
amassed property, and who ftesire that the succeeding generations
might enjoy the use and benefit thereof without possibility of the
corpus being squandered or otherwise impaired, and those, on the
other hand, who recognize the need of a rule embodying the principle
of public policy, that the first purpose of property is its complete
and unrestricted enjoyment, and that under no circumstance should it
be dedicated to or diverted toward a purpose foreign thereto.
To better

underst&~d

the subject of perpetuities and the

rule governing the same, we might refer to Chief Baron Gilbert's
definition -- "A perpetuity is the settlement of an interest descend--'

able from heir to heir, so that it should not be in the power of him
in whom it i s vested, to dispose of it or turn it out of the channel".
Lord Nottingham, in the Duke of Norfolk's case, the case recognized
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by Mr. Gray, an authority on the subject of perpetuities, as laying
the foundation for the modern rule against perpetuities, said:
perpetuity is the settlement of

~~
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estate or interest in tail with

such remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power
of the tenant in tail in possession, to dock by recovery or assign
ment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the
estate".
Blackstone in Book II, in discussing the merits of per
petuities sets out that

ncova~ts

of justice will not indulge even

wills so as to create a perpetuity, which the law abhors: because
by perpetuities (or the settlement of an interest, which shall go
in the succession prescribed, without any power of alienation)
estates are made incapable of answering those ends, of social commerce,
and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which
property was at first established H •
The rule against perpetuities has been gradually established
by judicial deCisions, and affords a most notable instance of the
nice adaptation of the principles of the common law to the decision
of a question which requires at once a due regard for the rights of
persons and property, and a careful consideration of these larger
problems of public policy so essential to the welfare of

co~munities

and states, for public policy is opposed to the perpetual settlement
of property in families in such manner that it is forever inalienable,
or inalienable so long as there may be a person to take in answering
the designation of some testator who died generations before.
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Briefly summarizing the evil practices of the common
law preceding and responsible for the rule against perpetuities,
we find (1) the creation of indestructible estates tail, (2) the
imposition of conditions against the alienation of present inter
ests, and (3) the creation of estates that would not vest until
some remote time, in futuro.

These common law practices were

respectively countered (1) by a rule making estates tail destruct
ible, (2) by a rule against rest raints on alienation, making void,
all unreasonable restraints or conditions against alienation of a
present interest, and (3) by the rule against perpetuities sometimes
referred to as the rule against remoteness, which voided all inter
ests or estates which might vest beyond the prescribed period.

All

of these practices were motivated by the desire to continue exer
cisL~g

an influence on the affairs of the world after death, and all

of the rules counteracting these practices were predicated upon the
principl.e that property should be diverted to its proper channel
without unreasonable delay.
Without further reviewing the historical phases, we shall
consider the rules against perpetuities and against restraints upon
alienation insofar a s they apply to present day trusts, both living
and testamentary, created and administered in tr,is state.

To

simplify this treatise we shall consider a hypothetical case, in
the light of the law, both legislative and judicial, of the State of
California.
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Let us assume a set of facts where the Trustor, a
widower, creates a private or living trust by formal written
Declaration of Trust by and with a corporate Trustee.
The trus t provides that the Trustor might revoke the
same during his lifetime, but that in the event of
out such revocation the corpus

sr~

~is

death with

be divided among certain named

beneficiaries, children and grandchildren of the Trustor, and among
the issue of certain of the said beneficiaries, by right of repres
entation, should said named beneficiaries be deceased or die before
having attained majority.

It further provides that should any of

the said issue, taking by right of representation, not yet have
attained the age of majority, then the trust shall continue as to
such issue until such issue shall severally attain majority.
trust further provides,
"In the event that any of the children of
the said Trustor hereinbefore named as benefi
ciaries hereunder, should predecease the said
Trustor, then and in tr.. a t event, upon the death
of the s aid Trustor, the s aid Trustee shall pay,
transfer and convey the portion or portions of
said trust estate to which such deceased child
01:' deceased children would have been entitled
had he, she or they been living at the time of
the death of the said Trustor, equally, share
and share alike, to the issue of such deceased
clrlld or deceased children living at the time
of the death of the s aid Trustor.
"In the ·event that any of such surviving
issue of any deceased child, or deceased chil
dren of said Trustor, shall not have attained
the age of majority at the time of the death
of the s aid Trustor, then and in that event,
the s aid Trustee shall continue to hold in the
m~~ner and according to the terms and conditions
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The

of this Declaration of T~Jst, the portion
or portions of said trust estate to which
such surviving issue under the age of majority
are entitled, and as each of such surviving
issue severally attains the age of majority,
the said Trustee sha~l pay, transfer and con
vey to him Ol~ to her, his or her proportionate
share of said trust estate. 1f
By the wording of the paragraphs just quoted, the Trustor
obviously intends that the share or shares of is sue of any deceased
child of the Trustor should continue in trust until the respective
majorities of such issue, irrespective of whether such issue be

~rn

before or after the date of creation of the said trust.

Is such a trt1St void under the laws of the State of
California, by virtue of its provision that the share of certain
i ssue, whether born before or after the date of execution of the
living tYust, should continue in trust for such issue until major
ity.

In other words, can a Trustor validly create a living trust

to endure beyond the lifetime of a person or persons in being, at
the date of the creation of the trust?

The solution of this problem involves the consideration
of the following quotations on perpetuities and restraint upon
alienation found in the Constitution and Civil Code of the State
of California, viz:
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The Constitution, Pxt. XX, Sec. IX, provides:
"No perpetuities shall be allowed except
for eleemosynary purposes ll •
Pertinent sections from the Civil Code provide
as follows:
C. C. 715. Restraints upon F~ienation.
"Except in the single case mentioned in
Section Seven Hundred Seventy- Two, the absolute
p017er of alienation cannot be suspended, by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period tb~n as follows:
1. During the contL~uance of the lives of
nersons in being at the creation of the limi
tation or conditions; or
2. For a period not to exceed twenty- five
(25) years from the time of the creation of the
suspension. II

c.

C. 772. Contingent Remainder in Fee.
IIA contingent remainder in fee may be created
on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the
event that the persons to whom the first remainder
is limited, die under the age of twenty-one years,
or upon any other contingency by which the estate
of such persons may be determined before they
attain majority."
C. C. 716. Future Interests void, which suspend
Power of ft~ienation.
IIEvery future interest is void in its
creation which by any possibility may suspend
the absolute power of alienation for a longer
period thru1 is prescribed in this chapter. Such
power of alienation is suspended when there are
no persons in bell1g by whom an absolute interest
in possession can be conveyed."
C. C. 771. Suspension by Trust.
liThe suspension of all power to alienate
the subject of a trust other than a power to
exchange it for other property to be held upon
the same trust, or to sell it and reinvest the
proceeds to be held upon the same trust, is a
suspension of the power of alienation within
the meaning of Section Seven Hundred and Fifteen.Tl
C. C. 749. Time of Creation, what .
liThe delivery of the grant, where a limi
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tation, condition or future interest is
created by grant, @ld the death of the
Testator, where it is created by will, is
to be deemed the -time of the creation of the
limitation, condition or interest within the
meaning of this part of the code."
TIME OF COM1ilENCEMENT OF SUSPENSION.

That the time of commencement of the suspension of the
power of alienation is the time of the execution of the Declaration
of Trust, is clearly the meaning of C. C. 749, and is a conclusion
supported by the decisions of the highest courts of this State.
the

insta~t ' case

In

there is a possibility of birth of issue to one or

more of the children of the Trustor, which_children might in turn
predecease the Trustor, in which event the trust would be continued
until the majority of beneficiaries not in being at the date of
execution of the Declaration of Trust.
As to the time of commencement of the suspension of the
power of alienation in a living or private trust, the Estate of
Willey, 128 Cal. 1, is authority for the rule that the deed of trust
vests the fee in the Trustee, subject only to the declared trusts
and the execution thereof, and that the deed of trust declaring the
trust in favor of the grantor for life, and reserving to him the
power of revocation and modification of its provisions, and a direc
tion to sell and convey any part of the pl'operty, and providing that
·after his death the residue and remainder of the property should be
held in trust to receive the income ill1d distribute it to certain
'-"

named beneficiaries, leaves only the equivalent of a life estate in
the grantor and not a fee simple.
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At page 9 of the last mentioned case
the Court says: liThe deed vested the fee
in the Trustees subject only to the declared
trust. The reserved right to revoke was a
mere privilege and as it was never exercised
it had no effect upon the estate gronted.
'Except as hereinafter provided, every ex-press
trust in real property, v8~id as such in its
creation, vests the whole estate in the
Trustees, subject only to the execution of
the trust'. (C.C. 865.)
"Section 2280 expressly provides that
a trust mcLy be revoked if the Declaration
of Trust reserves the power of revocation,
and to hold that the power of revocation pre
vents the vesting of an estate in the Trustee,
would be to throw statutory provisions on the
subject into utter confusion. There was at
farthest nothing more left in_~he grfultor than
the equivalent of a life estate.1t
In the case of Tenant vs. John Tennant Memorial Home"
167 Cal. 570, in considering the effect upon the conveyance where
the deed reserves unto the grantee the right to revoke, the Court
held:
"The effect of the reservation of the life
estate is that the deed conveys a future inter
est, only, to the grantee. In respect to the
time of enjoyment, an interest in realty is
either present or future (C.C. 688.). A future
interest entitles the owner to the possession
of the property only at a future period (C.C.
690.). A future interest is a vested interest
when there is a person in being who will have
a right, defeasible or indefeasible, to the
immediate possession of the property when the
intermediate estate or interest ceases (C.C.
694.). This deed therefore purports to pass to
the grantee at once a vested future interest in
the land, said interest being the entire fee,
following the termination of the reserved life
estate."
Continuing further, the Court holds:
flS O , also, the fact that in this case there

-8
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is also reserved a power to revoke the deed
and to sell the remainder, is of no consequence
in the argument upon the question whether it
is or is not testamentary. The power of
revocation being valid, its exercise would at
once revest the title in the grantor and she
Vlould then have absolute power to dispose of
it by deed or otherwise. The power of sale
reserved is therefore of no consequence, since
it was necessarily included in the power to
revoke. rne reservation of the power to revoke
did not operate to destroy, or in anYwise
restrict the effect of the deed as a ~resent
conveyance of a future vested interest. It
merely afforded the means whereby such vested
future estate could be defeated and divested _
before it ripened into an estate in possession.
(See Nichols vs. Emery 109 Cal. 323.)."
PEF..IOD OF SUSPENSION .ALLOWED BY LAW.
" .

In the instant case Section 715 of the Civil Code is
applicable only as to subdivision 1, measuring the duration of the
period of suspension by lIlives of persons in being".

In dismissing

subdivision 2, however, which was added to the s aid section in 1917,
and which purports to permit a suspension for a definite period not
to exceed t wenty-five (25) years from the time of the creation of
the suspension, a passing reference should be made to Est ate of
McCray, decided by the District

COl~t

of Appeal of California on

October 25, 1927, and reported in 54 Cal. App . Dec. 625 and 160
Pac. 940.

This case held as unconstitutional the 1917 amendment

on the ground that our Constitution incorporated the

co~~on

law

"Rule against Perpetuities" limiting the duration of trusts to the
length of IIlives in being", and that a trust for a fixed term of
years might exceed the said COTI'JIlon law limit of duration.
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Although

the District Court of Appeal on November 25, 1927, denied a
rehearing of this case, a petition for rehearing was granted
by the Supreme Court of

C8~ifornia

on December 22, 1927, and

the final decision thereon is awaited with intereste
In interpreting subdivision 1 of Section 715 of the
Civil Code, the decisions in this State are unanimous, with the
possible exception of Goldtree vs. Thompson (79 Cal. 613), which
may be distinguished, in holding void any trusts which by any
possibility may suspend the absolute power
period longer than that of

~ives

of

alienation for a

in being at the date of the

creation of the trust.
In Berry vs. Lebus, 56 Cal. App. 578, the Court con

siders the validity of a trust deed .wherein the Trustor has
provided that upon his death, certain property should go to
certain designated beneficiaries, and in the event of the death
of one of the said beneficiaries, then to such beneficiary's
issue as they respectively attain the ages of twenty-five, thirty
and thirty-five years.

The trust deed was attacked as void on the

ground that it might possibly extend beyond lives in being at the
date of its creation, inasmuch as the said issue of a beneficiary
predeceasing the Trustor might be born after the date of the
creation of the trust.
The court in sustaining the trust justifies its pos
ition by quoting a saving naragra£h in the trust deed, reading as
follows, to-wit:
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"It is distinctly understood that it
is not the intent hereof to create a trust
extending beyond lives in being; therefore,
in any event, upon the death of the last
survivor of persons herein mentioned now in
being, this trust shall cease and determine
and distribution of the principal of the
entire net trust estate then held hereunder
shall thereupon be made by said Trtlstee to
the persons or person then entitled thereto
under the terms hereof."
In the Estate of wnitney reported in 176 Cal. 12, at
page 15, considering the validity of a testamentary trust whereby
the testator divided his estate in trust among his three children,
each to truce his share upon arriving at the age of thirty-five
years, and providing further that

shou~d

one of the sons die before

the said age, the share of such deceased son was to continue in
trust until the youngest child of such deceased son should become
of age, the Court in discussing the period during which the power
of alienation may be suspended, declares as follows:
liThe time of the death of the testator
is deemed to be the time of the 'creation of
the limitation, condition, or future interest'
declared to be void by the code sections above
mentioned (C.C. 749). Section 716 declares
that 'every future interest is void in its
creation which, by any possibility', may sus
pend the power of alienation longer than the
code permits. This possibility is to be
determined by the conditions existing 'at the
time of the creation' of the limitation or
future interests, - that is, at the time of
the death of the testator. 'The statute does
not permit us to wait and see whether events
may not so transpire that in fact no perpetuity
results, but if under the terms of the deed or
will creating the trust, when properly construed,
the instrument Iby any possibility may suspend'
the absolute power of alienation beyond the con
tinuance of lives in being, the instrument,
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whether a deed or will, is void, and no
trust is created nor any estate vested in
the trustees.' (Est. Steele 124 Cal. 537;
Gray on Perpetuities, Sec. 231)";
}£ter a further discussion of the case, the Court con
tinuing at page 18, states:
"If the effect of these provlslons in
the possible event that a child shall die
leaving a minor child or children, is that
the title to the share is to be held by the
trustees thereafter until the youngest child
is of age and shall at that time, and not
before, become vested in those of the issue
that may then be living and the children, if
any, of any deceased child, then it would con
stitute a gift to a class of persons, not in
being at the death of the testator, and neither
the number of the class nor the persons who are
to compose the class could be known or ascer
tained until the youngest surviving child became
of age. (See 1357 C.C.) Such remainder would be
a future contingent interest which could not be
aliened until the child became of age. (C.C.
693-695) Then, for the first time, the persons
who are to o~~ it would become known. That
event must occur after the termination of the
life of the child of the testator. From the
death of such cluld. until the ~oungest of such
issue became of age the ~ow~r of aliepation
would be suspended, contrary to Section 715,
aforesaid. (Est. of Cavarly 119 Cal. 409.)
Under Section 716, such limitation would be void
in its creation."
In the Estate of Lux. 149 Cal. 200, the testator created
a testamentary trust to continue "during the life of my son, Charles
H. Lux, and of all of his children who are living at the time of my
(the testatorIs) death.

With the death of the survivor of them the

said trust is to terminate tl •

The Court in sustaining the validity

of the will as against the objection that the ultimate beneficiaries
might not be in being at the time of the creation of the trust, at
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page 205, decides:
liThe devise to the Trustees became
effectual only at the death of the deceased.
The limitation or condition which had the
effect of suspending the absolute power of
alienation was created when the devise
became effectual. Under the provisions of
the will, the trust cannot continue beyond
the contL~uance of lives of persons in being
at that time. n
In the Estate of Cavarly, 1I9 Cal. 406, decided in 1897,
and before the amendment of 715 C. C. permitting the suspension of
the power of alienation for a twenty-five year period, the Court
has under consideration a

testa~entary

trust whose terms provide

that it shall continue "until my said younger son, Frank Bolles
Cavarly, shall, or would if living. reach the age of thirty zears".
The Court declf:.res such trust to be void as suspending
the power of alienation for a time certain and not dependent upon
any life or lives in being.

The proponents of the document argued

that if the postponement were too remote the postponement would be
void as against public policy and as repugnant to the estate granted,
and that the postponement being void, the estate would vest in
possession within the period allowed, citing Saunders vs. Vautier,
4 Beav. 1I5; Gray on Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 105; Gray on
Perpetuities, Sec. 12Q; and 1 Jarman on Wills 292.
The Court in answering this argument at page 409, states:
nWe are not disposed to dispute these pro
positions laid down by the learned counsel of
the appellant. Our statute i p not, properly
speaking. against oerpetuities. It simply pro
hibits restraints upon alienatiQll. The
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declaration that a future estate is void
in its creation, which thus suspends the
power of alienation, is to the same end.
It is void if by any possibility it may
suspend the absolute power of alienation
beyond the prescribed period. Upon this
point Chaplin, in his work on Suspension
of Alienation, Section 1, remarks - speaking
of the New York statute, from which ours was
copied - that it affects all estates of every
character wInch are capable of interfering
with the power of alienation, and, secondly,
that it does not insist upon the vesting of
estates, but only their alienability. The
doctrine of remoteness, therefore, has no
materiality, except as it affects aliena
bility. n
In Toland vs. Toland 123 Cal. 140, in considering a will
which provided for the sale of lands lias soon as the leases of
rented lands are cancelled", the Court met contestant's objection
that such suspension violated Sections 715 and 716 of the Civil
Code, by stating that the tenants could at any time cancel their
leases by agreement with the Executor to unite with him in the
conveyance of the fee and possession of the land.

At page 143 we

find:
"The statute does not prohibit all limi
tations of estates by which the power of
alienation is suspended, but permits a sus
pension of such power with the restriction
that the suspension shall not continue beyond
the period of lives in being at the creation
of the limitation, and in Section 716 defines
this restriction as follows: 'Such power of
alienation is suspended when there are no
persons in being by whom an absolute interest
in possession can be conveyed'. Consequently,
whenever there are persons in being by whom an
absolute interest in possession in the land
can be conveyed, the power of alienation is
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not suspended. 1I
In the Estate of' Steele 124 Cal. 5]£, there is before
the Court a testamentary trust to continue during the lifetime
of the widow of the testator, and to terminate as to three named
minor cbildren when they respectively attain the age of twentyfive years.

Contestants argued that

sL~ce

no provision was made

for the remainder over, in the event of the death of all of the
said children under the age of twenty-five years, the trust must
continue for a definite time, to-wit, until the youngest child
would have attained the age of twenty-five years, and was there
fore void.
The Court in sustaining the

v8~idity

of the document

calls attention at page 540, to the distinction between trusts
void at the time of their creation and resulting trusts arislllg
from failure of beneficiaries.
!fA distinction should be taken between
trusts which fail for want of beneficiaries,
and trusts attempted to be created by will,
but which are void under the statute against
perpetuities, or other statutes, and there
fore vest no estate in the alleged trustee;
while if the trust is valid when created, and
afterward fails for the want of a beneficiary,
a trust results in favor of the heirs of the
testator; but as the heirs and trustee may at
any time convey ~~ absolute estate, the re
sulting trust is not within the statute agaL~s t
perpetuities. tI
The Estate of Van Wyck 185 Cal.
point in considering the instant case.

4~,

is particularly in

Henry Van Wyck created a

testamentary trust to endure during the lifetimes of his son and
daughter, and provided that upon the death of the survivor of them,
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IItheir or its descendants shall take the corpus" of the estate,
provided, however, that the property shoLud continue in trust
l1until the youngest grandchild shall become twenty-one years of
age, and then to divide among and deliver absolutely to my grand
children then surviving, and the lawful issue of any deceased
grandchild by right of representation, all of my (testator's)
estate then remaining iXl the hands of my trustee ll •
held that

a trust

continue until the

The Court

created by a will which provides that it shall
yotk~gest

grandchild of the testator shall have

become of the age of twenty-one years, is void as suspending the
power of alienation for a longer period than that of the life of a
person or persons in being at the time of the testator's death,
since the

yotk~gest

grandchild would include a grandchild born after

such death.
In demonstrating the possibility of this trust extending
beyond lives in being, the Court argues that since it is possible
that a great-grandson might be born after the death of the testator's
son and daughter, it is evident that upon their deaths, all persons
necessary for the complete alienation may not be in being and the
power of alienation will still be suspended; and continuing at page
59,IIIt follows that if, after the death of
the testator's son and daughter but before the
youngest grandchild had reached twenty-one, all
of the beneficiaries under the will should unite
in an alienation, the alienation would not be
complete, since there would still be outstanding
the possible interest of any crdld born there
after to a grandchild then living and joining in
the alienation but who should die before the
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arrival of the time provided by the will for
division. Under the will then, it is possible
that, UPOll the death of the testator's son and
daughter, the trust must continue with the
power of alienation suspended 14~til the youngest
grandchild reaches twenty-one, since it may not
be possible to determine sooner who is entitled
to receive the corpus of the estate; that such,
in fact, will be the situation if more than one
grandchild survives the son and daughter. ~
possible period, therefore, during which the
power of' alienation may be suspended.extends to
the time when the xoungest grandchild reaches
twenty-one, and since such grandchild may be one
born after the death of the testator, such period
is other than one for the lives of persons in
being at the time of the creation of the trust,
ru1d the trust comes within the prohibition of the
statute."
In answer to proponent's argument that the will created
a case of alternative limitations, where if one be bad and the
other valid, the invalidity of one would not affect the other, at
page 61, the Court replies that
"There is but one limitation, namely, that
the trust shall remain intact with a consequent
suspension of the power of alienation until the
youngest grandchild reaches twenty-one. This
event mayor may not happen within the lives of
persons in being at the testator's death, and
therefore the period fixed is a period not
measured by the lives of such persons and is not
permitted by the statute.1!
One of the most recent devisions on the subject under
consideration is the Estate of Maltman, reported in 195 Cal. 643.

Mr. Maltman attempted a testamentary

tr~s t

by will, providing that

one-half of his estate should be held in trust during the lifetimes
of his daughter, Teresa, her husband and their daughter, and the
other half to be held in trust

durL~g
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the lifetimes of his son John,

John's wife and their children !tso long as they or either of
them sh....all live ll , and when "his (John I s) wife and all of his
children shall have died said trust shall cease and terminate".
After quoting Sections 715 and 716 of our Civil Code,
the Court continues at page 649, as follows:
lilt is not necessary to again indulge in an
elaborate review of the history or proper inter
prepation of these two sections of the Civil
Code. That was done at much length and with
great learning in the leading case of Estate of
Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, from the reasoning of
which there has been no material departure since
its decision thirty years ago.
Two particular
clauses found in these sections of the Civil Code
have been given more exact definitions in later
cases. One of these is the clause found in both
of these sections referring to the 'creation' of
the limitation, condition, estate or interest
affected by the inhibition of these code pro
visions.
"In Estate of 'Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, it was
held that the time of the death of the testator
whose will contained provisions for the creation
of such condition, limitation, estate or interest
was the date fixed by these code sections for the
purpose of determining their validity (C.C. 749.).
The court in that case quoted approvingly from
Estate of Steele, 124 Ce~. 555. The language of
the Court in that case to the effect that 'The
statute does not permit us to wait and see whether
events may not so transpire that in fact no per
petuity results, but if under the terms of the
deed or will creating the trust, when properly
construed, the instrument "by any possibility max
suspend" the absolute power of alienation beyond
the continuance of lives in being, the instrument,
whether a deed or wiLl, is void, and no trust is
created nor any estate vested in the trustee'."
The leading case in this State on the present subject
is in reo Walkerly. 108 Cal. 627.

The Court in an

ey~austive

and well reasoned opinion sets out the law concerning the suspension

-.1..8

of the power of alienation.

This case was decided in 1895

and before the amendment of Section 715 C. C., permitting
trusts to continue for a definite period of time.

The reason

ing, however, of this case and the law therein set out, are
none the less relevant and applicable to the instant case.

The

testamentar,r trust attempted, provided that the property of the
decedent should remain in trust for a period of twenty-five
years, or should his wife be then still living, it should con
tinue in trust during her lifetime.
The Court in applying the restrictions upon alienation
to trusts as well as other conveyances, after citing Civil Code
Sections 715, 716, 771

a.11Q.

749, exhaustively reviews the law on

this subject, declaring at page 647 et seq:

UA perpetuity is any limitation or
condition which may (not which will or must)
take away or suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a period beyond the contin
uance of lives in being. The absolute power
of alienation is equivalent to the power of
conveying an absolute fee (Chaplin on Sus
pension of Alienation, Section 64). The law
against the suspension of the power of alien
ation applies to every kind of conveyance and
devise. It applies to a~l trusts whether
created by ¥I-ill or deed, whether providing
for remainders or executory devises, or, as
here, merely restraining the power of alien
ation for a fixed period of years, and then
provising for s 8~e with gift over. In short,
it 'covers the entire field of estates,
interests, rights and possibilities' (Chaplin
Suspension of Alienation, Section 2.). Says
Perry: fA perpetuity will no more be tolerated
when it is covered by a trust than when it
displays itself undisguised in the settlement
of a legal estate' (Perry on Trusts, Section
382), 8..'1d Section 771 of the Civil Code is but
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an enactment of this rule.
JrEvery express trust, valid in its
creation, vests the whole estate in the
trustees. The beneficiaries t ake no estate
or interest in the property, but may enforce
the performance of the trust. (C. C. 863.)
If this trust be not valid in its creation,
the trustees would take no estate, but neither
would the beneficiaries, whose rights are de
pendent upon the validity of the trust. ~-lPk
The beneficiaries herein then take no estate
as such, their interest being the right to the
enforcement of the trust.
I~ut, if we understand the position of
respondents, it is contended that the nephews
~~d nieces take a future estate, which future
estate is vested and is alienable, and that
therefore it is a valid estate, since only those
future interests are void which by possibility
may unduly suspend the power of alienation.
Following this argument and for this purpose
treating the interests of the beneficiaries as
a future interest or estate withL~ the contem
plating of the code (C.C. 716.), it may be first
suggested that all expectant estates, whether
vested in interest or contingent with a vested
right, or entirely contingent, pass by succession,
will and transfer, like present estates and
interests. (C.C. 699.) But the fact that such
interests may pass does not relieve from the
operation of the rule unless there are persons
in being who, by combining and conveying all
their distinct interests created by the original
grant or deVise, can pass an absolute interest
in possession.
Conceding that the future inter
est of the beneficiaries is vested in the sense
in which remainders are spoken of as vesting, and
that the interest would thus be alienable, it
still is not such an interest as would by transfer
carry an absolute interest in possession. As is
pointed out by the Court in Vanderpoel vs. Loew,
112 N.Y. 167, the vesting of an estate involves
absolute alienability only so far as that partic
ular estate is concerned. The fact that a give~
remainder is vested renders it absolutely
alienable, so far as it i s itself concerned, but
the absolute fee may at the same ti~e be inalien
able. Therefore, to convey this absolute interest
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in possession the beneficiaries would· be
compelled to unite with their conveyance
that of the trustees in whom the fee is
vested.
But the trustees cannot convey
until the ~iration of twenty-five years.
An attempt by them to convey before that
time would contravene the trust. and be a
void act (C.C. 870), and so even by this
method of progression our path leads to
that barrier of perpetuity which cannot be
surmounted.
nso, even though the beneficiary should
be a remainder man under such a trust as this,
he still could not alienate the land within
the trust period so as to avoid the statute.
Such a trust cannot be terminated or destroyed
during the period fixed for the existence, even
by the consent ruld joint act of all the trustees
and beneficiaries. (Douglas vs. Cruger, 80 N.Y.
15, Penfield vs. Tower 1 N.D. 216.)
"Hence the question whether the interest of
the beneficiaries is contingent or vested is here
of no possible moment. The absolute ali§nability
required by Section 715 of the Civil Code does not
imply vesting, and it affords no escape from the
operation of the rule, because the interests which
the beneficiaries take may be relieved from un
certainty as to persons or events. V~'hen so
relieved the interest may be said to be vested.
But it is not such a vesting nor yet such an
interest as removes the bar of the statute, since
all of the interests and estates, contingent and
vested, cannot convey the fee so long as the terms
of the trust, from which alone their interests are
derived stand in the way. The Derpetuity here does
not result from too remote limitations or the fail
ure of future estates to vest, but it arises by
the direct act of the testator in forbidding his
trustees to alienate for a period not tolerated by
:t.he law. It

TRUSTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Answering the contention

sometL~es

advanced that the

restrictions on the suspension of alienation apply only to real
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property, in re Walkerly (supra) may again be cited, this
time as authority for the proposition that trusts in personal
property come within 715 C.C.

At page 656 et seq. we read as

follows:
liThe essential difference in this state
between trusts in real property known as
express trusts, and those in personal property
are: 1. The former can only be of the kinds
permitted by the statute, and no others (Civ.
Code, sec. 857), while the latter may be
created generally for any purpose for which a
contract may be made (Civ. Code sec. 2220);
2. The former must be created and declared by
1J'rriting (Civ. Code, sec. 852), while the latter
may rest upon parol. (Civ. Code, sec. 2222.)
But to all trusts, whether of real or personal
property, the limitation upon the suspension of
the power of alienation expressed in Section 715
of the Civil Code directly applies. The Section
is found in Division II, Part 1, Title II, of the
Code where the lawmakers are dealing; as expressly
declared, with the modifications of o~TIership and
restraints upon alienation of 'property in general'.
Again, Section 771 of the Civil Code shows plainly
the applicability of the law to personal property.
For if it be oP~Y the suspension of the power to
alienate real property which is ~Ulder the ban,
power to sell the rea~ty would relieve the diff
iculty, and yet it is by that section e~~ressly
declared that personal property held after sale
under the terms of the original trust operates
to suspend the power of alienation, ~mder Section
715 of the Civil Code. And finally, the applica
bility of Section 715 to trusts in pers onal
property has often been recognized and never
Sl,uestioned. (Estate of Hinckley, supra; Goldtree
v. Thompson, 79 Cal. 615; Williams v. Williams,
75 Cal. 99; wDitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192)
tlWe are not unmindful of the fact that the
statutes of the State of New York in express
terms put a limitation upon the power to suspend
the ownership of personal property. (1 N.Y. Rev.
Stats., Sec. 775, Subd. 1.)
And we r~ve not
overlooked the circumstance tlw.t the Supreme
Courts of Mic:bigan and Wisconsin have uniformly
held that their statutes similar in terms to our
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Code provlSlons do not apply to trusts in
personal property. But it is to be observed
that the Legislature of this State, in adopt
ing Section 715 of the Civil Code, pl aced it
where it must apply, and, therefore, made it
apply to ' property in general i , while the
corresponding Section in the Michigan statutes
(Howell's Annotated Statutes of Michigan, Sec.
5551, Subd. 15), and that of the Wisconsin
s tatutes (Wis. Rev. StQts. Sec. 2059), are
found in the Chapters of the law relating to
estates in real property, and so have been
construed by the Court s to be applicable only
to trusts in such property (Toms. v. Williams,
41 Mich. 552; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wi s . 70;
Palms v. P8~S, 68 Mich. 555; De Wolf v. Lawson,
supra).
"In those states it is held that, as to
trusts in personal property, the common-law rule
still obtains. And it is for the application
of thi s rule that respondents here contend. But
even this would not avail to save the trust.
The common-law rule against perpetuities does
not, as counsel argue, apply only to l anded
estates. Executory devises, springing and shift
i ng uses, and trust s whether of r ealty or person
alty were all within its terms. (1 Jarman on
Wills, C. 9; Lewis on Perpetuities, 159; Perry
on Trusts, Secs. 377, 584; Lewin on Trusts, c. 7;
Gray on Perpetuities, Sec. 202; 4 Kent' s Commen
taries, 271; Cadellv. Palmer, 1 Clark & F. 372).
As Jarman states: 'To the test of the rule
settled by Cadell v. Pauner, supra, every gift
of real or personal estate, by will or otherwi se ,
must be brought' (1 Jarman on Wills, 217)."
"By the Thelluson Act ( 39 & 40 Geo. III, c.
98) the may"imum ?eriod during which the power of
alienation could be restrained was lives in being
and t wenty-one years and nine months. Testated
by that act still would this trust be invalid.
"We hold , however, tha.t section 715 of the
Civil Code not only applies to trusts in pers onal
~~o p erty, but als o that it shortens t he period
permitted by the common law to lives in being.
Private trusts in personal property whicll suspend
the power of alienation must be limited like
private trus ts in realty to lives in being, and
the trusts here (covering person8~ property) are
consequently destroyed by the same vice which
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invalidated those first considered
(covering real property).11
S~ARABILITY

OF VOID

M~D

VALID PROVISIONS.

As to whether or not the valid provisions of trusts
and wills might be sustained while the invalid ones are disre
garded as violative of the law, the following citations are
offered.

In Nellis vs.

~ickard

135 Cal. 617, sustaining the

valid trusts on the theory that they are severable from the
invalid ones, the Court quotes Gray in his Rule agains t Perpet
uities, Section 341, at page 621, as follows:
"When the settlor or testator has him
self separated the contingencies, there is
no difficulty in regarding the gifts
separate~, and upholding one, although the
other fails. And the Courts naturally, &~d
properly, le&~ to construing the gifts
separately, when it can be done."
Remarking that the test should be the possibility of
sustaining the valid clause without giving effect to the invalid
clause, the Court

contL~ues

on page 621, et seq:

"If the several trusts are not so inter
dependent as that neither one can be dealt
with without giving effect to the others, the
. Court will sort out the good from the bad,
and give effect to the valid trusts."
In the Estate of Willey, (supra) at page 11, in dis
cussing the separability of valid from void provisions, the Court
says:
"The principle which should govern
courts in determining questions like the
one now under review, whether they arise
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out of wills or deeds, is expressed by the
maxim - ut res magis valeat quam pereat;
and, under the inspiration of that maxim,
courts have firmly established the prin
ciple that valid trusts shoD~d not be
disregarded because in the instrument
creating them one particular invalid trust
is declared, unless the latter is so in
separably blended with the others that it
cannot be eliminated without destroying the
main intent of the trustor, or working
manifest injustice to other beneficiaries.
Among the various authorities cited by
appellant to this point, Darling vs. Rogers,
22 Wend. 483, Vanschuyver vs. ~rulford, 59
N.Y. 452, Kennedy vs. Hoy 105 N.Y. 154, and
Kane vs. Gott, 24 Wend. 641, 55 Am. Dec. 641,
may be mentioned as cases where the subject
is fully discussed and the principle aptly
stated."
In the Estate of Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, in discussing
the same subject and after quoting the above excerpt from the
Estate of Willey (supra) the Court continues at page 19:
"If the elimination of the void trust
causes no important practical change in the
testator' s general scheme, if such void trust
is not essential thereto, and does not impair
the validity of the other dispositions of the
will, it may be cut off and the other disposi
tions allowed to stand. (Manice vs. Manice,
43 N.Y. 381.) If the trust created 'is of such
a nature as to make it indivisible, and in
capable of being carried out as to that trust
which is clearly legal, because of the invalid
ity of the other trust', the whole trust must
be held void. (Nellis vs. Rickard 155 Cal.
620.). "fhe question whet her the valid clauses
can stand depends on whether or not the invalid
ones are so interwoven with them that they cannot
be elimli1ated without interfering with and chang
ing the main scheme of the testator. In Darling
vs. Rogers 22 Wend. (N. Y. ) 495, Senator Verplanck
correctly stated the rule as follows: "When a
will is good in part and bad in part, the part
otherwise valid is void if it works such a dis
tribution of the estate as, from the whole
testament taken together, was evidently never
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the design of the testator. Otherwise,
when a good part is so far independent
that it would have stood had the testator
been aware of the invalidity of the rest".'
(Estate of Fair 132 Cal. 540.)n
In the Estate of Van Wyck 185 Cal. 49, in stating at
page 61 that lithe question is one of separabilityll, the Court
continues at page 62, et seq:
"The real question presented where a
will contains both valid and invalid pro
visions is whether the two are so parts of
a single plan or scheme or otherwise so
dependent one upon the other that by avoid
ing the invalid provisions and allowing the
valid to stand there vall result a disposi
tion of the estate so different from what
the testator contemplated or so unreasonable
that it must be presumed that the testator
would not have made the valid provisions if
he had been aware of the invalidity of the
others. The rule in fact is frequently stated
more strongly against allowing the valid pro
visions to stand than we have just stated it.1I
The Court follows with the citations of estate of Fair
and Darling vs. Rogers, quoting the ?ortions as set forth in the
Estate of Vf.hitney (supra); and continuing at page 65 the Court
renders its decision as f ollows :
"In other words, it appears that the
valid and i..'1valid portions of the trust
which the testator attempted to create are
so intimately connected and so dependent one
REan the other that the invalid portions
cannot be taken away without the whole scheme
and plan of the testator fa~ling. The trust
must therefore be declared invalid in toto."
In the Estate of Steele (supra) at page 537 the Court
after referring to Section 716 of the Civil Code,
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Il

which declares

Ivoid in its creation I every future interest which 'by any
possibility may suspend' et cetera", continues,
HThe statute does not permit us to
wait and see whether events may not so trans
pire that in fact no perpetuity results, but
if under the terms of the deed or will
creating the trust, when properly construed,
the instrument 'by any possibility ma.y sus
pend' the absolute power of alienation beyond
the continuance of lives in being, the instr£
ment, whether a deed or will, i s void , and no
trtlSt i s created nor any estate vested in the
trustee. T1
In the Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 525, involving a trust
to convey before such trust was permitted by statute, at page 552,
the Court declares:
"Of course, if an estate be created sub
ject to several trus ts, one of wl-'..ich is void,
and the latter is legQ.lly separable from the
others, the estate vests, unaff ected by the
void trust; but i f the creation of the estate
depends upon the execu.tion of t he void trust,
then it can never come into existence. 1I
.And at -)age 541 after citing an excerpt from Darling vs.
Rogers as quoted (supra) in the Estate of Whitney, the Court
con-'-0
"lnues:
"Jl.nd in the celebrated Tilden will case
(Tilden vs. Greene, 150 N.Y. 50) the Courts
say: 'The appellants invoke the aid of the
principle that where several trusts are created
by will which are independent of each other,
and each complete in itself, some of which are
lawful and others unlawful, and which may be
separated from each other, the illegal trust
may be cut off and the legal one permitted to
st2~d.
This rule i s of frequent application
in the construction of wills, but it can only
be applied in aid and assistance of the
manifest intent of the test ator and never
where it will lead to a result contrary to the
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purposes OI the will, or work injustice
among the beneIiciaries, or defeat the
testator's scheme Ior the disposal of his
proper ty. r -* ~:- -;:- * We hold that the in
validity of the trust to convey destroys
the whole schenie of the will, and carries
with it the trust for the lives of the
children. II
At page 546 in answer to the argument that to destroy
the trust would mean intestacy OI the testator as to that portion
of the estate over which he attempted to create a trust, the
Court quotes the Estate of Yo-ung, 123 Cal. 343, as follows:
"One of these rules firmly established
and never departed from nor even criticized,
is, that the expressed intent will not be
varied under the guise of correction because
the testator misapprehended its legal effect.
The testator is presumed to know the law.
If the legal effect of his expressed intent is
intestacy.2 i t will be presumed that he designe;!
that result. The inquiry will not go to the
secret workings of the mind of the testator.
It is not, ~nut did he mean? but it is, What
do his words mean? n
In the Estate of Maltman (supra) the Court leans upon
the above quoted excerpts from the Estate of Van Wyck, Estate of
Fair and Darling vs. Rogers, in holding that the valid and void
provisions are nso far inseparable that the holding of the one
portion thereof void as in violation of the statute against per
petuities, invalidates the entire trust.1t
In reo Walkerly (already quoted at some length on
other points) the Court on pages 651 and 652 in declaring the
trust void answers as follows proponents objection that the tes
tatar's intention has been violated:
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"So it happens that whenever a tes
tator, through temerity or ignorance,
violates the plain mandate of the statute,
as in this case, and creates a trust by
which the absolute power of alienation is
sought to be suspended for a term of years,
he must pay the penalty of his rashness or
folly in the destruction of his cherished
design. * ~l- -J~ ~- The intestacy of the tes
tator as to the Walkerly block is the harsh
result which must follow this void trust, and
the property will descend to his heirs. It
is true that such was not the testator's
L~tent, but a testator must do more than
merely evince an intention to disinherit
before the heirs' right of succession can
be cut off. He must make a valid disposition
of his property. (Harberghan vs. Vincent,
2 Ves. Jr. 204; Halley vs . James 16 Wend.
150; Haynes vs. Sherman, 117 N.Y. 433)."

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS.
Summarizing the foregoing citations, we find that the
constitutional and legisla tive enactments as interpreted by the
judicial decisions of this State establish as law, (1) that the
suspension of the power of alienation commences in a living trust
at the time of its creation, even though the right to revoke be
reserved by the Trustor; (2) that the limit of the duration of
such suspension is the lifetime of a person or persons in being at
the time of such commencement of suspension; (3) that the pro
bibition against such suspension applies to personal property
as well as real property; and (4) that where both valid and in
valid provisions are contained in a trust, all constituting a
single plan or scheme intimately connected and interwoven, the
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trust is void in its entirety.

Applying these legal prin

ciples to the instant case, we find that the attempted trust
suspends the power of alienation for a period longer than lives
in being at the date of the execution of the Declaration of
Trust and, the Trustor's intentions to the contrary notwith
standing, the purported

tr~st

is void in toto and ab initio,

no estate has vested in the Trustee, and in the absence of some
other conveyance or a testamentary disposition by the Trustor,
he must be found to have died intestate as to the property com
prising the "corpus" of this attempted invalid trust.

Respectfully submitted to
THE SCHOOL OF LAW, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY,

.

'

-30

